










In real life settings and in the everyday flow of moral experience it is often difficult to pin down 
the substance of our feelings. It might be argued, however, that compassion leaves us in no 
doubt of its cause and motive. It is widely held to involve individuals in some distressing sen-
sations that are derived from a strong moral identification with an other’s pain. It is, moreover, 
often depicted not only as particularly fiery and intense, but also, and more so as when com-
pared to pity, sympathy and empathy, as a feeling that motivates beneficent actions. It is a 
profoundly moral emotion. When gripped by sentiments of compassion people are motivated 
to take actions to combat the pains borne through suffering. In this respect, it has a prosocial 
orientation. Compassion has the effect of making individuals deeply concerned to take actions 
on behalf of the safety, well-being and good of others. It is a motive force in the basic acts of 
kindness and care that create and sustain human social life. 
Compassion is a natural part of our most intimate relationships. It is experienced in the 
bonds of love and affection of good family relationships. It takes root in the ties of friendship 
whereby we are made duty bound to take care one another. Compassion is also advanced as a 
public virtue, and there are a range of institutional settings where it is actively cultivated on 
behalf of the good of society as a whole. For example, it is championed as a desired attribute 
of health care professionals. Compassion is an essential part of good nursing and of constructive 
physician-patient relationships. In the contexts of health care, it is even considered to be an 
important part of the ‘emotional work’ that promotes healing and recovery (Neff 2003). Com-
passion is also identified as a vital part of teaching practices that aim to equip children with the 
self-confidence, courage and social skills to engage in effective learning. By taking steps to 
create compassionate classrooms, teachers aim to provide pupils with environments that nurture 
their social adaptability and personal resilience as well as conditions that equip them with life 
skills to operate as good citizens (Markinek et al. 2006). 
Beyond this, compassion is encountered in everyday life as a potent force in our politics, 
and especially where these are concerned with matters of humanitarian social justice. An appeal 
2 
 
to compassion features large in campaigns for human and animal rights. Indeed, it is often her-
alded as the primary motive for movements of progressive social change. For a long time now 
it has been widely recognised that a cultural politics of compassion is a vital part of the arsenal 
deployed to convince people to lend their support to humanitarian causes. Arguably the exist-
ence and influence of organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Mé-
decins Sans Frontières and Oxfam bears testimony to the strength of its appeal (Berlant 2004). 
Indeed, such organisations operate as a direct means for people to channel the moral feelings 
aroused in response to mediatized imagery of the suffering of distant strangers into political 
action. Moreover, in taking note of the role played by mass communication media in rendering 
the social world and its problems immediately visible to us on a grand scale, commentators note 
that our political leaders frequently take great care to appear compassionate when out in public. 
We are living in a time where many political debates appear to be shaped more by the quality 
of people’s feelings towards others than by matters of sheer calculation or rational principle 
(Ure and Frost 2014). In this context, individuals operating in the public domain must be adept 
at displaying compassion whenever this is required from them. Plays on, and displays of, com-
passion are now a routine part of the exercise of political power. 
Compassion is also a hot topic of scholarly debate. This is connected to a widespread 
understanding that it holds the potential to reveal some of the most elemental truths about hu-
man nature and the moral character of human society (Nussbaum 1996). Questioning how in-
dividuals are liable to feel compassion for others is taken as a means to engage in the attempt 
to understand both the moral conditions that make for human well-being and those of society 
at large. It is further recognized as an emotional disposition and form of experience that holds 
the potential to provide us with insights into processes of human civilization that are the signa-
ture tune of modern identity and consciousness (King 2000). It is generally recognized, more-
over, that in the 21st century we are witnessing a significant heightening of many controversies 
associated with how we might denote the role of compassion in social life and how we should 
assess its human value (Olasky 2000; Woodward 2002). There are many contrasting points of 
view on how we should understand the conditions that either heighten or attenuate compassion-
ate sentiments. There is no agreement on what role compassion should play in human affairs or 
on what this emotional experience does to us. Much dispute surrounds the extent to which the 
active cultivation of compassion is desirable, or on how, if at all, this should take place (Zemby-
las 2013). 
In part this is connected to the ways in which emotions such as pity, sympathy and com-
passion are understood to operate as enactments of power relations in which weaker and more 
vulnerable members of society are dominated by institutionally over-privileged individuals. 
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Here the ‘ideology of compassion’ is condemned on the grounds that it frequently operates as 
a form of class condescension or as a force of Nietzschean ressentiment (Paley 2002). Some 
argue, moreover, that sentiments of compassion have a tendency to short-circuit people’s ca-
pacity to think critically about the best ways to actively respond to people’s suffering to a point 
that endangers democracy (Arendt 1963). 
The controversies surrounding compassion are further connected to the ways in which it 
is now often perceived to be left diminished or reduced to a state of exhaustion. It has become 
commonplace to associate compassion with the possibility that some are particularly prone to 
experience ‘compassion fatigue’ (Sprang et al. 2007). On this account, it should be studied with 
a focus brought to institutional arrangements and forms of social interaction that are set to 
harden people’s sensibilities to a point where they have little capacity to feel for the suffering 
of others (Hooper et al. 2010). It is also approached as a matter that requires us to attend to the 
ways in which traumatic encounters with sensationalized portrayals of human suffering, and 
especially those we regularly come across through our interactions with modern communica-
tion media, are serving to render compassion ever more strained and elusive (Moeller 1999). 
Here it is generally assumed that we are living amidst social and cultural conditions that operate 
to erode human kindness and the disposition to care, and that these are now being experienced 
in ever-more intensifying forms. 
This chapter reviews the cultural and social history of compassion. It highlights the in-
volvement of compassion in the creation and maintenance of conditions of everyday life in 
western modernity. It is designed to equip readers with some resources to think critically about 
the range of moral, political and social interests that are featured in favoured accounts of com-
passion and its consequences. In later sections, it provides some analytical reflections on con-
temporary forms of ‘compassion fatigue’. While a repeated emphasis is brought to the fact that 
compassion always courts controversy, it also aims to underline the potential for this to marshal 
critical debate towards the institutional configuration and moral character of society. 
 
A Turbulent History 
There is a long tradition of philosophical debate over how to understand the moral psychology 
of compassion, and over how it should be depicted as a human virtue. Its moral character has 
often been questioned on the grounds that, while compassion may inspire acts of kindness and 
care, it can also be appropriated on behalf of self-serving interests, or even as a means to carry 
out an abuse of power. In classical antiquity compassion attracted a considerable amount of 
debate in connection with its involvement in the cultivation of human decency and sound polity 
(Konstan 2006; Sternberg 2005). It was taken by ancient Greek tragedians along with Stoic and 
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Socratic philosophers as a component of moral reason and as an attribute of human moral ‘in-
telligence’ (Nussbaum 2001). Right from the start, however, it was also recognized as involving 
us in the difficulty of interpreting the moral motives that lie behind an individual’s capacity to 
feel for the pains of others, and especially insofar as such sentiment was perceived to have an 
‘egoistic dimension’ that was more concerned with self-gratification than with the condition of 
those suffering (Konstan 2014:180). It was also brought into controversy in connection with 
the problem of determining the kinds of actions that could be justified on the grounds of a 
compassionate identification with others. As David Konstan notes, such a high state of emotion 
was understood by the Roman historian Polybius to be accompanied by the danger that it could 
serve as the pretext for maniacal behaviours. The virtue of compassion was questioned in light 
of the fact that there are occasions where, in the heat of the moment, people are so overcome 
with by the urge to vent their feelings that they are rendered incapable of operating with moral 
restraint (Konstan 2014:181). 
Such debates have accompanied literary accounts of compassion throughout Western his-
tory (Paster 2005). It is generally recognized, however, that these are further complicated and 
intensified when popular understandings and practices of compassion come under the influence 
of Christianity. Here compassion is attached to a theological concern with redemptive suffering 
and is praised as a saintly virtue that warrants careful cultivation. The culture of compassion 
holds a special place for those seeking an affective identification with Jesus’s humanity, his 
redemptive suffering and his example of charitable care for the sick and poor. It is also espe-
cially valued in devotional practices concerned with the compassionate grief of his mother, 
Mary. Within the writings of the early church fathers through the patristic period (c.100-450 
CE) repeated attempts were made to instruct Christians on the appropriate ways to display com-
passion both in feeling and action (Perkins 1995). Through the middle ages and up to the early 
modern period many devotional practices were developed that employ literature, art and music 
as a means to arouse and intensify emotional reactions to the passion of Christ (Lazikani 2015; 
McNamer 2010). Many of these are now understood to have had lasting impacts on the Western 
iconography of human suffering and the aesthetics of pain. In this respect, moreover, some 
identify the cultural politics of modern humanitarianism as operating to adapt these traditions 
for the promotion of human welfare and projects of social reform (Dromi 2016). 
It is important to note, however, that through most of the history of Christendom com-
passionate almsgiving and charitable care for the sick and dying existed alongside practices that 
most modern people would now disassociate from acts of kindness and care. More often than 
not the charitable and devotional compassion of the Christian church has operated with little 
concern to combat the violent persecution of heretics. From a modern perspective, it may be 
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particularly disturbing to note the extent to which compassion has been implicated in acts of 
torture and execution. In efforts to save sinners from mortal damnation or to protect communi-
ties from the wrath of a vengeful God, an appeal to compassion has often been used to justify 
the punishments meted out to those breaking established moral codes or flouting religious cus-
tom. The period of the European Reformations is particularly noteworthy for the extent to which 
the pursuit of religious orthodoxy and uniformity of belief was accompanied by what Alexandra 
Walsham labels as a ‘charitable hatred’ that resulted in unprecedented numbers of people being 
scourged, pilloried or burnt at the stake while standing accused of theological dissent, idolatry, 
sexual immorality or witchcraft (Walsham 2006). 
It is against this history that some of the more radical attributions of modern compassion 
are brought to light. It is widely acknowledged that through the second half of the 18th century, 
early modern societies witnessed a ‘humanitarian revolution’ and that this has had many lasting 
and profound impacts on the ways people now negotiate with the problem of suffering and the 
ethics of care (Pinker 2011). In this context, and partly in reaction against age-old practices of 
religious intolerance and violence, compassion was heralded as an attribute of a new culture of 
‘enlightenment’ and ‘civil society’ (Frazer 2010; Mullan 1988). It appears that the dawning of 
the so-called age of modernity was accompanied by what the historian Keith Thomas refers to 
as an outbreak of ‘spontaneous tender heartedness’ (Thomas 1983:173-175). At this point, com-
passion came to be ever more strongly identified with heightened humanitarian convictions and 
forms of politics motivated by a pronounced moral revulsion towards a great deal of suffering 
that was henceforth deemed ‘excessive’, ‘unnecessary’, ‘without moral purpose’ and ‘unjust’ 
(Wilkinson and Kleinman 2016:25-54). 
Here moral sentiments of compassion fuelled campaigns to abolish slavery, movements 
to oppose the use of torture in criminal proceedings, new-found concerns for animal welfare 
and crusades for the promotion of women’s and children’s rights (Sznaider 2001). It became 
commonplace to identify compassion as the wellspring of human care and as the source from 
which the stream of human kindness flows. In many quarters of ‘polite society’ considerable 
efforts were taken to craft moral manners and sensibilities whereby one might stand out as a 
man or woman ‘of feeling’ motivated to set the good of others as his or her prime concern 
(Barker-Benfield 1992). 
At the same time, it is important to recognize that this newly invigorated cult of sensibility 
was accompanied by a vociferous culture of critical debate. The critical interrogation of com-
passion was taken to new ground by philosophers such as David Hume and Adam Smith, who 
surpassed their classical forbearers in their devotion to questioning the moral psychology of 
compassionate feelings and the extent to which they could be allied, it if at all, with principled 
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reason (Hume 1734-1740/1929, 1751/1987; Smith 1759/2006). Compassion was further held 
morally suspect by essayists such as Henry Mackenzie for the extent to which it gave reign to 
an ‘enthusiasm’ in which people were liable to indulge feelings to the cost of conscience (Mac-
kenzie 1785/2001). Indeed, in this regard many understood it to operate as a succour to promis-
cuous voyeurism (Halttunen 1995). Mary Wollstonecraft, moreover, was particularly worried 
by those who used the popular portrayal of women as particularly prone to compassion as a 
pretext to claim that they were also intellectually limited and had no serious part to play in 
reasoned public debate (Wollstonecraft 1792/1994). 
Following the French Revolution of 1789 and the ferocious retributions of the ‘reign of 
terror’ (1793-1794), public debates over the virtue of compassion were characterized by more 
deeply entrenched conflicts of moral opinion (Jones 1993). Some held ever more strongly to 
the view that, as Hannah Arendt puts it, the ‘passion of compassion’ was the ‘driving force of 
revolutionaries’ who feel justified to use extreme acts violence as the means to achieve their 
aims (Arendt 1963). From this perspective, compassion was exposed as excessively dangerous, 
and in light of its potential to operate as the motivation for fanatical and barbarous actions, it 
was increasingly advised that steps should be taken to limit its influence over the domains of 
civil politics and rational policy debate. Indeed, this period of history is now looked back upon 
as initiating the view that, as far as serious academic inquiry is concerned, moral sentiment 
should be regarded more as an intellectual pollutant than as an aid to reasoned judgement 
(Reddy 2000). 
At the same time, however, whilst not shying away from the fact that compassion is an 
inherently unstable emotion that may drive some to adopt violence as the means to express their 
moral feelings, others continued to celebrate its humanitarian potential. During the 19th century, 
authors of so-called ‘social novels’ such as Charles Dickens and Harriet Beecher Stowe con-
tinued to work at cultivating their reader’s compassion as a means to draw the brutalizing pov-
erty of the new industrial labouring classes and the horrors of slavery into public debate. Indeed, 
as far as Stowe is concerned Greg Crane reports that she took ‘the eruption of moral sympathetic 
feeling’ evoked by graphic accounts of the cruelty done to slaves as a ‘sure signal’ that all 
human beings were entitled to ‘fundamental human rights’ (Crane 1996:177-186). Along with 
many others campaigners for humanitarian social reform, Stowe could not be moved from the 
conviction that it was only insofar as people were made preoccupied by the ‘moral-emotional 
dissonance’ of sentiments of compassion that they could be equipped with the political zeal to 
oppose social institutions that deliver harm to human life (Crane 1996:177-186). 
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Such strongly opposed points of view on the virtue of compassion continue through to 
the present day, and on many accounts these still hold far-reaching consequences for the con-
duct of contemporary law and politics (Wilkinson 2017). Indeed, it might be argued that in the 
21st century we are living amidst cultural processes, with political arrangements and within 
social conditions in which the controversy of compassion is set to intensify. In recognition of 
this fact, moreover, it is increasingly being taken up as a matter for sociological inquiry where 
it is treated as an issue that draws the historical peculiarity of our social character and cultural 
circumstance into sharp relief. 
 
Problems for Sociology 
A great deal of cross-disciplinary inquiry is now taking place across the humanities and social 
sciences into how compassionate sentiments are acquired and intensified. The history and so-
ciology of emotions have been developed into highly elaborated fields of study. For as long as 
compassion has been drawn into debate it has also been recognized that its relative qualities 
and intensities are subject to processes of acculturation and cultivation. In contemporary schol-
arship, however, there is no agreement on how we should venture to understand the social con-
ditions under which individuals are set to make this a shared concern. Furthermore, much dis-
pute surrounds how these should be assessed. A considerable conflict of interpretations presides 
over the attempt to relate the history of compassion to generalized accounts of people’s social 
character and to the dynamics governing processes of social change. This is due to the fact that 
it not only involves us in the difficulty of charting the inter-relationships between material con-
ditions, social arrangements and cultural outlooks, but also, in brokering with divergent politi-
cal and moral points of view on their human value and consequences. 
It is widely observed that the moral dispensation to respond with compassion towards the 
grievances and hardships of others is moderated by the material circumstances in which we are 
made to live. It is frequently noted that compassionate feelings are an indulgence for those who 
are removed from a great deal of suffering and who occupy a materially privileged position 
from which it is possible to extend care and kindness to others (McCloskey 2004). It is only 
where people can afford the time and space to both nurture and give reign to their feelings that 
they are made preoccupied by compassion. In this regard, the heightened moral sensibility of 
modern people from the late 18th century onwards can be attributed to the fact that here we find 
increasing numbers experiencing levels of economic prosperity in which the age-old tooth and 
nail struggle for survival was no longer a condition of everyday life. A considerable amount of 
scholarly inquiry is devoted to the role played by modern capitalism and the rise of a commer-
cial society in the promotion of compassion as a human virtue and aid to civility (Davis and 
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Taithe 2011; Haskell 1985a, 1985b). Certainly, it is the case that, at least in the early period of 
its history, the extension of capitalist social relations across societies and national boundaries, 
was perceived to be accompanied by a distinct ‘softening’ of manners and conduct (Herman 
2001:91-99). It is argued that people realized that it was to their commercial benefit to offer a 
hand of friendship to strangers, and thereby, that a capitalist market did much to ‘extend the 
scope of public compassion … however unintentionally’ (Sznaider 2001:11). 
Of course, this begs many more questions about the conditions under which capitalism 
can be allied with civility. It also invites debate to be brought to the extent to which the moral 
economy of compassion is liable to be disciplined by class interests or left tailored for largely 
commercial considerations (Manfredi 2013). Others rightly point out that there are contrasting 
forms of capitalism and market relations and that many of these are designed to operate, as Max 
Weber puts it, ‘without regard for persons’ (Weber 1948). Indeed, even Thomas Haskell, who 
is perhaps most heavily associated with the claim that capitalism has a propensity to create 
social connections between people that create space for the extension of compassion, is keen to 
underline the fact that ‘complex institutions like the market have multiple and contradictory 
effects’, and that many of these are virulently, and perhaps violently, committed to promote 
forms of social interaction that occlude compassion (Haskell 1987:859). 
In the work of Émile Durkheim we have an early acknowledgement of this complexity as 
he attempts to expose the contrasting psychological and moral effects of the processes of indi-
vidualization that accompany modern capitalist divisions of labour. Durkheim aims to have us 
understand that at the same time as we might be subject to the pains and confusions of anomie 
and the selfish impulse of egoism we also have a propensity to be much affected by a ‘moral 
individualism’ that is possessed by ‘sympathy for all that is human, a wider pity for all suffer-
ings, for all human miseries, a more ardent desire to combat and alleviate them [and] a greater 
thirst of social justice’ (Durkheim 1898/1973:48-49). Arguably, however, Durkheim’s service 
to us here lies more in drawing a light to the inherent complexity and frustrations of modern 
individualism than in providing us with an adequately refined account of how to advance cul-
tural conditions and institutional arrangements that enable the maturation of our compassionate 
propensities. 
In pursuit of this goal, many now look to the work of Norbert Elias as a guide to charting 
the social arrangements, cultural proclivities and political formations that make individuals 
more or less disposed towards compassion. Here conditions of modernity are perceived to result 
from long-term ‘civilizing’ processes that have delivered individuals into forms of society in 
which they are made to acquire a shared concern to inhibit violent impulses as well as height-
ened dispensations to relate to one another with sympathy (Elias 1994). The vicissitudes of the 
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compassionate temperament of modern times are construed as the product of a culture of man-
ners that is also tied to the development and spread of state institutions that regulate society to 
the rule of calculation. In addition to this, they are also understood to be a part of the creation 
of social connections between people in which they encouraged to form relationships of mutual 
self-regard. Elias argues that these are all mutually complimentary processes. From this per-
spective there is an intimate connection between, on the one hand, the advancement of cold-
calculating forces of rationalization, and on the other hand, an enhanced moral preoccupation 
with moral sentiments of compassion. It is possible, moreover to identify modern campaigns 
for humanitarian social reform as operating with both these concerns set to the fore. At the same 
time as they aim to marshal the appeal of compassion as a moral standard for human conduct 
they are also involved in efforts to extend the disciplinary force of ‘civilization’ upon society. 
Indeed, from an Eliasian perspective it is argued that these concerns are mutually reinforcing 
and reciprocally enhancing, even while immersing people in quite contradictory and conflictual 
experiences of everyday life (Linklater 2010; Sznaider 1997; Vaughan 2000). 
Elias also encourages us to reflect on the potential for civilizing processes to be accom-
panied by de-civilizing trends, and raises the prospect that there may be periods where such 
trends reshape people’s mentalities and moral sensibilities so that they are more disposed to 
behave with cruelty and violence. In his later study of the rise of the Nazis in 1930s Germany, 
he explains how it is possible for de-civilising trends rise to dominate the ‘habitus’ of some 
sectors of society so that ‘civilizing’ processes are undermined and fall into decline (Elias 
1997). Indeed, this is how he accounts for the violence of the German National Socialist move-
ment, the popular appeal of its racist ideology and the events that led to ‘the final solution’ 
(Dunning and Mennell 1998). Accordingly, even within processes where long-term civilizing 
trends work to encourage the cultivation of compassionate sensibilities there may be sudden 
and dramatic shifts in people’s moral proclivities so that, as Elias puts it, ‘the armour of civi-
lized conduct’ can very rapidly ‘crumble’ (Elias 1994:253n). 
Cas Wouters has seized on this insight in order to argue that existing alongside processes 
that operate to ‘formalise’ our manners and conduct there are also movements towards ‘infor-
malisation’. On this account, through the 20th century it is possible to chart significant shifts in 
the balance between the formalising and informalising processes of our times (Wouters 2007). 
Wouters claims that, from around the 1960s onwards and particularly following the rise of mass 
consumerism, the ‘expressive revolution’ that accompanied movements towards people’s sex-
ual liberation and the fuller realization of human rights for women, people of colour and the 
working classes, we can chart the increasing prevalence of forms of emotional conduct that lack 
restraint. He contends that we are living through a period where, when compared to most other 
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times and places, individuals are much more at ease with, and more open about, discussing their 
feelings. Wouters argues that we are living in an age of ‘emotional emancipation’, but that this 
is also accompanied by ever more pronounced problems relating to how emotions should be 
appropriately managed and interpreted. People are faced with increasing social and cultural 
demands to become ‘reflexively’ oriented towards their emotional conduct as well as that of 
others. On this characterization of our times, as the bounds of emotional freedoms are extended, 
we are also set to encounter more elevated anxieties connected to how these should be expressed 
and understood. 
 
Anxieties of ‘Compassion Fatigue’  
It is only in the second half of the 20th century that ‘compassion fatigue’ acquired popular cur-
rency as a term to express concerns that we are living amidst processes and in face of events 
that are liable to exhaust people’s capacity to feel compassion for others. What is particularly 
unusual here is the normative assumption that individuals are disposed to be compassionate and 
that we should be worried by evidence to the contrary. A mere cursory review of our history 
would alert us to the fact that in most other times and places it is by no means common for 
people to regard compassion as an innate propensity or as a desirable public good (Arendt 
1963). Historically speaking, moreover, to openly worry over the condition of compassion fa-
tigue and its prevalence is quite exceptional. 
Compassion fatigue first appears in the late 1960s as a term of reference in debates over 
the forms of developmental aid and assistance that are provided by rich countries to less devel-
oped nations, and especially to sections of population designated as ‘refugees’ (Bennett 1969). 
It was initially used to refer to the apparent waning of public and political support for pro-
grammes of humanitarian assistance. Through the 1990s, however, it came to be increasingly 
associated with a move to blame modern media of communication, and especially those in-
volved in the production and transmission of sensationalized images of suffering, for normal-
izing people’s awareness of human tragedy, atrocity and disaster to a point where they can no 
summon the energy to react to this with compassion (Moeller 1999). In the 1990s it was further 
adopted as a term to denote experiences of ‘burnout’ among health care practitioners struggling 
to cope with the stress borne through the effort to empathize with other people’s suffering 
(Figley 1995). In these domains, moreover, there has been an increasing tendency to designate 
compassion fatigue as a ‘secondary traumatic stress disorder’, so that it is now treated as a 
distinct form of mental illness (Figley 2002). 
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From the perspective taken in this chapter, one of the more important things to note here 
is the involvement of worries over the waning or wearing down of compassion in wider anxie-
ties connected to the social reconfiguration of people’s relationships with others. For example, 
in some of the more sophisticated analytical renderings of the involvement of modern commu-
nication media in elevated states of compassion fatigue it is argued that the moral and political 
contradictions that arise for people in connection with the experience of being positioned as 
remote witnesses of other people’s suffering are without precedent. Luc Boltanski contends that 
the now widely shared experience of being a ‘detached observer’ of human affliction operates 
to intensify a shared sense of political powerlessness and moral inadequacy, for we routinely 
find that we have no morally adequate means to answer the imperative of action – to do some-
thing, anything to respond – that the brute facts of suffering impress upon us (Boltanski 1999). 
Indeed, the observation that this is now a normal part of our moral experience of everyday life 
is used to argue that the mass dissemination of the imagery of suffering via commercial forms 
of cultural reproduction and exchange is effecting a major transformation in the experience of 
social subjectivity. It is likely that we have scarcely begun to piece together an adequate under-
standing of what this implies for our terms of self-understanding or those by which we relate to 
others. Some hold that we may now be witnessing the creation of global interconnections and 
globalized moral consciousness that make possible new ‘empathic’ forms of civilization’ 
(Rifkin 2009). Others are more inclined to draw a focus to a potential for the ‘cultural appro-
priation’ of people’s suffering as a commercial news ‘infotainment’ to unhinge moral sensibil-
ity from longstanding ties of human responsibility (Kleinman and Kleinman 1996). Certainly, 
one might argue that whatever has taken place in the past is no longer a useful guide to instruct-
ing how we should navigate a course through the moral landscapes of the possible futures that 
lie ahead (Höijer 2004). 
Similarly, those involved in analysing the treatment of compassion fatigue experienced 
by health care professionals tend to operate with an open recognition of the fact that they are 
dealing with new conceptualisations of human health and with new conditions for health care 
in practice. Most discussions acknowledge that discourses of compassion fatigue are a relatively 
recent invention, and that these coincide not only with a greater concern to refine diagnostic 
accounts of traumatic forms of experience, but also, with more widespread worries among 
health professionals relating to work pressures in environments governed by neo-liberal cost-
cutting initiatives. At one level compassion fatigue is taken as a component of the affective 
worries and distresses borne under the experience of ever intensifying forces of rationalization 
and control. At another, it is approached as a new ‘risk’ that, once recognized as such, should 
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involve health care professionals in ever more concerted movements to advance ‘compassion-
ate care’ as a vocational concern (Dewar and Nolan 2013). 
In both these instances ‘compassion fatigue’ is connected to more pronounced anxieties 
relating to the moral condition of people’s emotional experience of everyday life. It is further 
taken as a conduit for debates over the moral significance of new frontiers of social and cultural 
experience. The inherent difficulties involved in taking compassion as a guide to action are 
compounded by further difficulties connected to how we should interpret and respond to pa-
tently new social arrangements and cultural conditions. Here the substance and meaning of 




As this chapter has shown, compassion is a ‘social emotion’. It alerts us to the quality of our 
moral attachments to others and calls on us to attend to how we bear a moral responsibility to 
relate people with care. It may well be, as Martha Nussbaum puts it, ‘the basic social emotion’, 
for it is often the case that compassion is implicated in the acquisition of the cultural disposition 
to relate to ourselves and others as inherently social beings (Nussbaum 1996). In this regard, 
moreover, the assorted controversies of compassion are tied to many contested and conflicting 
points of view on how we should relate to the conditions that govern our social lives, and espe-
cially in connection to how we interpret and respond to instances where these result in human 
suffering. 
In this chapter, I have sought to provide readers with insights into the genealogy of our 
modern culture of compassion. I have further underlined the ways in which compassion and its 
controversies hold the potential to provoke a questioning of the values enacted through prac-
tices of care in society, and especially in contexts where care for humanity is set as a prime 
concern. I have argued that anxieties over contemporary forms of ‘compassion fatigue’ repre-
sent a new stage in a long history of debate over the bounds and meaning of compassion, and 
that here it increasingly appears that our lives are being socially and cultural reconfigured so 
that the moral and political economy of our emotions are made ever more pressing matters of 
concern. By participating in debates over the controversies of compassion we also made to 
question the moral meaning of social life and its purpose. 
Sociologists committed to understanding the role played by compassion in contexts of 
everyday life are frequently, and perhaps unavoidably, involved in assessing its involvement in 
enactments of power relations. It is important to recognise, however, that the study of compas-
sion involves far more than a commitment to exposing its potential to operate in the service of 
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various political and social ideologies. There are wider issues at stake here that concern the 
potential for individuals to create humane forms of society. When studying compassion we are 
made to attend to how individuals are more or less equipped with the motivation to care for one 
another. In this regard, moreover, it is often the case that it involves us documenting how the 
boundaries of social recognition are drawn and how the bounds of moral responsibility are set 
in place. When studying the language, imagery and forms of communication that cultivate com-
passionate sentiments we are dealing with expressions and representations of substantive hu-
man values. These are fundamentally preoccupied with our response to people’s social suffer-
ing and with the actions we take to promote forms of social organisation to protect people from 
harm’s way. Under conditions of modernity sentiments of compassion are vital elements within 
the moral configuration of society as a whole.  
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